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Security Capabilities

What the OLIVE platform supports, what it requires from the cluster, and who turns it on.

Always on — nothing to configure, nothing to provide​

These are implemented in the services and the charts. They cannot be switched off from values.yaml and they need nothing from the cluster.

ControlWhat it does
Independent JWT validation in every serviceSignature, issuer, audience and expiry are checked by each service, not only at the edge. Internal traffic is not treated as inherently trusted
Egress guardOutbound HTTP calls to internal address ranges, Kubernetes-internal service names and link-local metadata addresses (169.254.169.254) are rejected before the request is made. Blocked attempts emit OLIFETCH1
Per-user authorization on addressable resourcesJobs, session memory and files are bound to the triggering user by an HMAC-derived token, so knowing an identifier is not sufficient to reach the resource
HTTP placeholder injection preventionPer-position character allow lists for URL host, port, method, query keys and values, header values and form bodies
Path traversal preventionIn the file storage service and in the secrets utility
Input validation and limitsLength, format, size, recursion depth, fan-out, archive size and entry counts
Browser-side protectionsCSP, CORS, CSRF and per-popup nonces, configured per service rather than left at defaults
Container hardeningNon-root, read-only root filesystem, allowPrivilegeEscalation: false, all capabilities dropped, seccomp: RuntimeDefault, AppArmor profile
Digest-pinned imagesEvery image, first- and third-party, referenced by SHA-256 digest rather than by a mutable tag
Pinned dependenciesAll npm packages pinned to exact versions with lockfile integrity, plus a seven-day cooldown before adopting a newly published third-party version
Security event catalogueStable event codes with actor, tenant, service, version, source and request ID

Switchable — and what the cluster must provide​

ControlCluster must provideWho switches it on
NetworkPolicy (default-deny, no cross-tenant traffic)A CNI that enforces NetworkPolicy (Cilium, Calico). Correct ingress-controller namespace and pod labelsplatform administrator, via global.networkPolicy.enabled
Service mesh mTLSAn Istio installation in the matching mode. Ambient is the supported shapeplatform administrator, via global.serviceMesh.mode
Image signature verificationKyverno, the kyverno-infra policies, registry credentials, and HTTPS egress from the Kyverno pods to Fulcio and Rekorplatform administrator, via tenant-setup.imageVerification.mode. Recommended steady state is audit, since enforce makes pod creation depend on those two public services — see the recommended posture
Image registry allow-listKyverno and the kyverno-infra policiesplatform administrator, via tenant-setup.imageRegistry.mode
Pod Security AdmissionKubernetes ≥ 1.25 (PSA is built in)On by default at baseline
Split service accountsHashiCorp Vault with the OLIVE role and policy setOn by default (serviceAccounts.mode: split)
MFAA Keycloak realm you administerplatform administrator, in the realm
Security log retention and access controlA log platform that supports per-stream retention and access rightsCluster operator, in the log platform
Encryption at restStorage classes, backup encryption, etcd encryption, key ownership. OLIVE configures none of it — see Secrets in etcd and Encryption at restCluster operator

Secrets in etcd​

A Kubernetes Secret is base64-encoded, not encrypted. Unless the cluster has encryption at rest configured for its etcd datastore, every Secret is readable in plaintext by anyone who can read etcd's data directory or a backup of it — including an etcd snapshot copied somewhere less protected than the cluster.

A running OLIVE deployment puts the following in etcd as Secrets:

WhatWhere it comes fromWhy it matters
Tenant secrets — CouchDB credentials, the OAuth2 Proxy client secret, cookie and Redis secretsMaterialised out of Vault by the Vault Secrets OperatorVault encrypts its own storage; the copy the pods consume is plaintext in etcd
vault-init-keysThe vault-infra bootstrap JobVault's unseal key shares. Reading these defeats Vault's own encryption entirely
Database and Keycloak credentialsCloudNativePG and the Keycloak chartDirect access to the tenant and identity databases
TLS private keyscert-managerThe platform's server certificates

So encrypting volumes without encrypting etcd protects the data stores while leaving the keys to them in the clear. If encryption at rest is a requirement in your environment, it applies to both, and etcd encryption is configured in the cluster rather than anywhere in OLIVE — a EncryptionConfiguration on the API server, or the managed equivalent (on EKS, envelope encryption with a KMS key, which can only be enabled at cluster creation).

Which Secrets can be recreated and which are lost for good if they disappear is a separate question, answered per Secret in Identity and Secrets.

A control that is configured but not enforced looks identical to one that works

Three of these fail silently:

  • A CNI that ignores NetworkPolicy accepts the objects and enforces nothing.
  • A Kyverno label that does not match what the policy selects produces a namespace that looks enrolled and is not.
  • A serviceMesh.mode that disagrees with what is installed produces policies for the wrong traffic shape — and the symptom is a timeout, not an error.

Verify each of them explicitly after enabling. The verification commands are on the individual pages.

Version requirements​

RequirementReason
Kubernetes 1.31 or latersecurityContext.appArmorProfile is GA from 1.31. Hosts that cannot enforce AppArmor — SELinux, OpenShift, some managed clusters — need global.appArmor: false, see Workload Hardening
A NetworkPolicy-enforcing CNICilium or Calico; the policies are inert otherwise
Istio with ambient mode (optional)ztunnel DaemonSet, HBONE on TCP 15008
Kyverno (optional)Admission policies, policy reports
HashiCorp VaultSecrets, per-tenant roles, Vault Secrets Operator
KeycloakIdentity, MFA, brute-force detection, audit logs

Ports and network facts worth knowing​

Port / rangeUsed for
TCP 15008HBONE tunnel between ambient-meshed workloads. Policies must allow it, or mesh traffic is silently blocked
TCP 15012Sidecar proxies reaching istiod. Only relevant in sidecar mode
169.254.7.127/32The link-local address istio-cni SNATs node-local kubelet probes to under ambient. Without a rule, every probe fails
4317 / 4318OTLP gRPC / HTTP to the observability collector. Egress is allowed by default; confirm the ports against your collector's Service
53 (kube-dns pods only)DNS egress. Scoped to the cluster DNS pods — an unscoped port-53 rule is an exfiltration channel