Security Capabilities
What the OLIVE platform supports, what it requires from the cluster, and who turns it on.
Always on — nothing to configure, nothing to provide
These are implemented in the services and the charts. They cannot be switched off from values.yaml and they need nothing from the cluster.
| Control | What it does |
|---|---|
| Independent JWT validation in every service | Signature, issuer, audience and expiry are checked by each service, not only at the edge. Internal traffic is not treated as inherently trusted |
| Egress guard | Outbound HTTP calls to internal address ranges, Kubernetes-internal service names and link-local metadata addresses (169.254.169.254) are rejected before the request is made. Blocked attempts emit OLIFETCH1 |
| Per-user authorization on addressable resources | Jobs, session memory and files are bound to the triggering user by an HMAC-derived token, so knowing an identifier is not sufficient to reach the resource |
| HTTP placeholder injection prevention | Per-position character allow lists for URL host, port, method, query keys and values, header values and form bodies |
| Path traversal prevention | In the file storage service and in the secrets utility |
| Input validation and limits | Length, format, size, recursion depth, fan-out, archive size and entry counts |
| Browser-side protections | CSP, CORS, CSRF and per-popup nonces, configured per service rather than left at defaults |
| Container hardening | Non-root, read-only root filesystem, allowPrivilegeEscalation: false, all capabilities dropped, seccomp: RuntimeDefault, AppArmor profile |
| Digest-pinned images | Every image, first- and third-party, referenced by SHA-256 digest rather than by a mutable tag |
| Pinned dependencies | All npm packages pinned to exact versions with lockfile integrity, plus a seven-day cooldown before adopting a newly published third-party version |
| Security event catalogue | Stable event codes with actor, tenant, service, version, source and request ID |
Switchable — and what the cluster must provide
| Control | Cluster must provide | Who switches it on |
|---|---|---|
| NetworkPolicy (default-deny, no cross-tenant traffic) | A CNI that enforces NetworkPolicy (Cilium, Calico). Correct ingress-controller namespace and pod labels | platform administrator, via global.networkPolicy.enabled |
| Service mesh mTLS | An Istio installation in the matching mode. Ambient is the supported shape | platform administrator, via global.serviceMesh.mode |
| Image signature verification | Kyverno, the kyverno-infra policies, registry credentials, and HTTPS egress from the Kyverno pods to Fulcio and Rekor | platform administrator, via tenant-setup.imageVerification.mode. Recommended steady state is audit, since enforce makes pod creation depend on those two public services — see the recommended posture |
| Image registry allow-list | Kyverno and the kyverno-infra policies | platform administrator, via tenant-setup.imageRegistry.mode |
| Pod Security Admission | Kubernetes ≥ 1.25 (PSA is built in) | On by default at baseline |
| Split service accounts | HashiCorp Vault with the OLIVE role and policy set | On by default (serviceAccounts.mode: split) |
| MFA | A Keycloak realm you administer | platform administrator, in the realm |
| Security log retention and access control | A log platform that supports per-stream retention and access rights | Cluster operator, in the log platform |
| Encryption at rest | Storage classes, backup encryption, etcd encryption, key ownership. OLIVE configures none of it — see Secrets in etcd and Encryption at rest | Cluster operator |
Secrets in etcd
A Kubernetes Secret is base64-encoded, not encrypted. Unless the cluster has encryption at rest configured for its etcd datastore, every Secret is readable in plaintext by anyone who can read etcd's data directory or a backup of it — including an etcd snapshot copied somewhere less protected than the cluster.
A running OLIVE deployment puts the following in etcd as Secrets:
| What | Where it comes from | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Tenant secrets — CouchDB credentials, the OAuth2 Proxy client secret, cookie and Redis secrets | Materialised out of Vault by the Vault Secrets Operator | Vault encrypts its own storage; the copy the pods consume is plaintext in etcd |
vault-init-keys | The vault-infra bootstrap Job | Vault's unseal key shares. Reading these defeats Vault's own encryption entirely |
| Database and Keycloak credentials | CloudNativePG and the Keycloak chart | Direct access to the tenant and identity databases |
| TLS private keys | cert-manager | The platform's server certificates |
So encrypting volumes without encrypting etcd protects the data stores while leaving the keys to them in the clear. If encryption at rest is a requirement in your environment, it applies to both, and etcd encryption is configured in the cluster rather than anywhere in OLIVE — a EncryptionConfiguration on the API server, or the managed equivalent (on EKS, envelope encryption with a KMS key, which can only be enabled at cluster creation).
Which Secrets can be recreated and which are lost for good if they disappear is a separate question, answered per Secret in Identity and Secrets.
Three of these fail silently:
- A CNI that ignores NetworkPolicy accepts the objects and enforces nothing.
- A Kyverno label that does not match what the policy selects produces a namespace that looks enrolled and is not.
- A
serviceMesh.modethat disagrees with what is installed produces policies for the wrong traffic shape — and the symptom is a timeout, not an error.
Verify each of them explicitly after enabling. The verification commands are on the individual pages.
Version requirements
| Requirement | Reason |
|---|---|
| Kubernetes 1.31 or later | securityContext.appArmorProfile is GA from 1.31. Hosts that cannot enforce AppArmor — SELinux, OpenShift, some managed clusters — need global.appArmor: false, see Workload Hardening |
| A NetworkPolicy-enforcing CNI | Cilium or Calico; the policies are inert otherwise |
| Istio with ambient mode (optional) | ztunnel DaemonSet, HBONE on TCP 15008 |
| Kyverno (optional) | Admission policies, policy reports |
| HashiCorp Vault | Secrets, per-tenant roles, Vault Secrets Operator |
| Keycloak | Identity, MFA, brute-force detection, audit logs |
Ports and network facts worth knowing
| Port / range | Used for |
|---|---|
| TCP 15008 | HBONE tunnel between ambient-meshed workloads. Policies must allow it, or mesh traffic is silently blocked |
| TCP 15012 | Sidecar proxies reaching istiod. Only relevant in sidecar mode |
169.254.7.127/32 | The link-local address istio-cni SNATs node-local kubelet probes to under ambient. Without a rule, every probe fails |
4317 / 4318 | OTLP gRPC / HTTP to the observability collector. Egress is allowed by default; confirm the ports against your collector's Service |
53 (kube-dns pods only) | DNS egress. Scoped to the cluster DNS pods — an unscoped port-53 rule is an exfiltration channel |